Posts tagged International Relations
President Evo Morales acted on a longtime threat Wednesday and expelled the U.S. Agency for International Development for allegedly seeking to undermine Bolivia’s leftist government, and he harangued Washington’s top diplomat for calling the Western Hemisphere his country’s “backyard.
Bolivia’s President Morales expels USAID, accused it of working against him | The Washington Post
I was going to comment on this. But I’ve been asked to do so on NPR affiliate WBEZ’s Worldview tomorrow. So I’m going to hold off until after that. Plus, I want to get my thoughts together on this.
Just in time for tomorrow’s “Apocalypse, Now!” discussion in POL 103 about international relations & global climate change. I’m also going to show this report on the Maldives.
From guardian:
The broadcaster and naturalist Sir David Attenborough says scientists and environmentalists have been cautious of overstating the dangers of global warming, but recent evidence of melting polar caps shows the situation is worse than had been thought. He also discusses population growth and disappearing habitats
A fascinating (!!) look at diplomacy in action—and in real time.
From thepoliticalnotebook:
International diplomacy in action… A very interesting set of tweets/exchanges between the feed for the Muslim Brotherhood (@Ikhwanweb) and that of the US Embassy in Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood decries the violence in Libya that killed the ambassador and three others, and moves on to denounce clashes at the embassy in Cairo. One of their tweets was this:
”.@khairatAlshater:We r relieved none of @USEmbassyCairo staff were harmed & hope US-Eg relations will sustain turbulence of Tuesday’s events”
To which the embassy responded:
”.@ikhwanweb Thanks. By the way, have you checked out your own Arabic feeds? I hope you know we read those too.”
(Oooh, snark.)
The latest in the exchange has been this from the Brotherhood:
”.@usembassycairo we understand you’re under a lot of stress, but it will be more helpful if you point out exactly the Arabic feed of concern”
All screencapped above.
From foreignaffairsmagazine:
The September/October issue of Foreign Affairs is now online!
Kindle, NOOK, and Google Play subscribers can also access the new issue on their devices.
The political debate in London reveals how immensely difficult—intellectually, morally, and politically—it was for Peel and his colleagues to withdraw [from Afghanistan]. They had to tackle the dense thicket of expert opinions on regional security, which had grown up to justify the intervention. They were forced to challenge parts of the military establishment and contradict the generals (many of whom continued to insist that all that was needed was a clearer mission, more resources, and more troops). They took the risk that withdrawal would leave Afghanistan in civil war, and that they would be accused of shirking their moral responsibility to improve conditions there. They accepted the humiliation of seeing their enemy, who they had invaded to topple, take back control. They ignored the media screams about cowardice and national disgrace. They faced down the fears about national security and loss of credibility. And by doing so, they avoided being trapped by the guilt, paranoia, and irrational momentum of war.
Rory Stewart, from his review of Diana Preston’s book The Dark Defile: Britain’s Catastrophic Invasion of Afghanistan, 1838-1842.
—As US combat casualties pass the 2000 mark in America’s longest war, some perspective from 1842.
(via politicalprof)
They [the British] needed to win the support of the population if they were to defeat the insurgency and build a legitimate state; but the population would not support a weak, corrupt state in the middle of an insurgency. To reassure the nationalists, the foreign force had to convince them they were leaving; and to reassure the supporters of the British, the foreign force had to convince them they were staying. Such political problems could not be solved with more troops. They were all (to use a British policymaker’s phrase) “the inevitable consequence of our position in Afghanistan.
Rory Stewart, in his review of Diana Preston’s book, The Dark Defile: Britain’s Catastrophic Invasion of Afghanistan, 1838–1842, about the British invasion and failed occupation of Afghanistan. In 1838-42.
Ah. Again.
(via politicalprof)
I’m teaching a section of Introduction to International Relations (POL 103) again this semester. I’ve decided to include three mini “conferences” (or debates/discussions/whatever) titled “Apocalypse Now” on various future threats and how the international community might deal with them: zombies, cyborgs, natural disaster, and alien invasion. I found this short video poking fun of Dan Drezner’s famous IR book about zombies. Enjoy!
Addendum: Here’s a link to the original Foreign Policy essay about zombies and international relations theory. I also struck zombies from the list, since I’ll assign Drezner’s FP article as a guide for how to think about the other three.
Fascinating look at cold war era US-China relations, among other things.
From globalvoices:
Ian Manley interviews a veteran of Kuomintang’s 93rd Division which left China in 1950 to settle in Burma and then finally in Thailand. The interview sheds light to the history of China’s ‘forgotten army’ which continued to fight in other countries for several decades.
SHIELD and the US: How Realistic Is the Avengers Movie?
“We couldn’t reconcile the unreality of this international organization and our place in it,” Phil Strub, the Defense Department’s Hollywood liaison, tells Danger Room. “To whom did S.H.I.E.L.D. answer? Did we work for S.H.I.E.L.D.? …
In case you were looking for an IR theory based review of The Avengers.
An excellent review of the history of NATO.
From america-abroad-media:
Host Ray Suarez looks back at NATO’s origin as a counterweight to Soviet military might, and its more recent history in the former Yugoslavia, Libya, and Afghanistan.
Over the past six decades, NATO has held together and grown, but not without its share of controversy and dissent.
In 1949, after two world wars, Europe was in shambles and the communist Soviet Union had become the most powerful military force on the continent. The democracies of Western Europe, fearing for their security, asked the United States to join them in a permanent political alliance. Lawrence Kaplan, a history professor at Georgetown University, says the US was uncertain.
“We did not want to make that kind of obligation, which would indeed have broken with the past. We didn’t want to join a European alliance.”
For over 140 years, the United States had made a principle of avoiding entanglements with foreign powers. But, Kaplan says, “The British and the French were so persistent. So the ‘North Atlantic’ becomes the key term to get away from the notion that this was joining Europe. Europe was joining us in a very specific way.”
US President Harry Truman explained his decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, as part of the struggle between communism and democracy known increasingly then as a “Cold War.”
(For the rest of the story, plus audio and video, visit us here )
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